Prostitution and Civil Rights (*)
by
Catharine A. MacKinnon (**)
Michigan Journal of Gender & Law, 1993, Volume 1: 13-31.
Copyright © 1993 Catharine A. MacKinnon. All Rights Reserved.
Part Two
Back to Part One
Indentured servitude has long been legally prohibited
in the United States, even prior to the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment. (42)
In interpreting the Thirteenth Amendment
in contemporary peonage contexts, courts have been far less concerned
with whether the condition was voluntarily entered and far more with
whether the subsequent service was involuntary. (43) That
victims believe they have no viable alternative but to serve
in the ways in which they are being forced has also supported a finding
of coercion, and with it the conclusion that the condition is one of
enslavement. (44) Involuntary
servitude has embraced situations in which a person has made a difficult
but rational decision to remain in bondage.(45)
If the legal standards for involuntary
servitude developed outside the sexual context are applied to the facts
of prostitution, the situations of most of the women in it are clearly
prohibited. In prostitution, human beings are bought and sold as chattel
for use in "distinctly personal service."
(46) Many
women and girls are sold by one pimp to another as well as from pimp
to trick and for pornography. Prostitution was not formerly called "white slavery" for
nothing. (47)
Prostitution occurs within multiple
power relations of domination, degradation, and subservience (48) of
the pimp and trick over the prostitute: men over women, older over
younger, citizen over alien, moneyed over impoverished, violent over
victimized, connected over isolated, housed over homeless, tolerated
and respected over despised. All of the forms of coercion and vulnerabilities
recognized under the Thirteenth Amendment are common in prostitution,
and then some. No social institution exceeds it in physical violence.
It is common for prostitutes to be deprived of food and sleep and money,
beaten, tortured, raped, and threatened with their lives, both as acts
for which the pimp is paid by other men and to keep the women in line. (49) Women
in prostitution are subject to near total domination. Much of this
is physical, but pimps also develop to a high art forms of nonphysical
force to subjugate the women's will. Their techniques of mind control
often exploit skills women have developed to survive sexual abuse,
such as denial, dissociation, and multiplicity. They also manipulate
women's desire for respect and self-respect.
Criminal laws against prostitution provide
legal force behind its social involuntariness. Women in prostitution
have no police protection because they are criminals, making pimps'
protection racket both possible and necessary. In addition to being
able to inflict physical abuse with impunity, pimps confiscate the
women's earnings and isolate them even beyond the stigma they carry.
The women then have nowhere but pimps to turn to bail them out after
arrest, leaving them in debt for their fines which must be worked out
in trade. Thus the law collaborates in enforcing women's involuntary
servitude by turning the victim of peonage into a criminal. (50) Such
legal complicity is state action, raising a claim under the Fourteenth
Amendment for sex discrimination by state law. (51)
While it is dangerous to imply that
some prostitution is forced, leaving the rest of it to seem free, as
a matter of fact, most if not all prostitution is ringed with
force in the most conventional sense, from incest to kidnapping to
forced drugging to assault to criminal law. Sex-based poverty, both
prior to and during prostitution, enforces it; while poverty alone
has not been recognized as making out a case of coercion, it has been
recognized as making exit impossible in many cases in which coercion
has been found. If all of the instances in which these factors interacted
to keep a woman in prostitution were addressed, there would be little
of it left.
Beyond this, the Thirteenth Amendment
may prohibit prostitution as an institution. In the words of The Three
Prostitutes' Collectives from Nice, "all prostitution is forced
prostitution . . . we would not lead the 'life' if we were in a position
to leave it." (52) In
this perspective, prostitution as such is coerced, hence could be prohibited
as servitude. At the very least, there is authority for taking the
victims' inequality into account when courts assess whether deprivation
of freedom of choice is proven. (53)
On a few occasions in the past, the
Thirteenth Amendment has been used to prosecute pimps for prostituting
women.(54) In
these federal criminal cases, the prostitution was forced in order
to pay a debt the women supposedly owed the pimp. In one case, the
defendant procured two women from a prison by paying their fines and
then forced them to repay him by prostituting at his road house. (55) In
another, young Mexican women were induced to accept free transportation
to jobs which did not exist and then were told they could not return
home until they repaid the cost of the transportation through prostitution. (56) These
women were financially trapped, sometimes physically assaulted, always
threatened, and in fear. Some complied with the prostitution; some
were able to resist. In these cases, the prostitution as such was not considered
involuntary servitude--the coercion into doing it was. But it is implicit
in these cases that prostitution is not something a woman, absent force,
would choose to do.
It is worth asking whether coercion
of women into sex in a Thirteenth Amendment context would be measured
by the legal standards by which courts have measured the coerciveness
of nonsexual exploitation of groups that include men. The coercion
of women into and within prostitution has been invisible because prostitution
is considered sex and sex is considered what women are for. The standards
for the meaning of women's "yes" in the sexual context range
from approximating a dead body's enthusiasm, to fighting back and screaming "no," to
pleading with an armed rapist to use a condom. (57) This
being free choice, one wonders what coercion would look like. Sex in
general, particularly sex for survival, is so pervasively merged with
the meaning of being a woman that whenever sex occurs, under whatever
conditions, the woman tends to be defined as freely acting.
Suits for prostitution as involuntary
servitude confront the notion that women--some women who are "just
like that" or women in general--are in prostitution freely. No
condition of freedom is prepared for by sexual abuse in childhood,
permits and condones repeated rapes and beatings, and subjects its
participants to a risk of premature death of forty times the national
average. (58) The
fact that most women in prostitution were sexually abused as
children, (59) and
most entered prostitution itself before they were adults, (60) undermines
the patina of freedom and the glamour of liberation that is the marketing
strategy apparently needed for most customers to enjoy using them.
Such suits would also challenge freedom of choice as a meaningful concept
for women under conditions of sex inequality. Women's precluded options
in societies that discriminate on the basis of sex, including in employment,
are fundamental to the prostitution context. If prostitution is a free
choice, why are the women with the fewest choices the ones most often
found doing it? (61)
When a battered woman sustains the abuse
of one man for economic survival for twenty years, not even this legal
system believes she consents to the abuse anymore. Asking why she did
not leave has begun to be replaced by noticing what keeps her there. (62) Perhaps
when women in prostitution sustain the abuse of thousands of men for
economic survival for twenty years, this will, at some point, come
to be understood as non-consensual as well. And many do not survive.
They are merely kept alive until they can no longer be used. Then they
are sold one last time to someone who kills them for sex, or they are
OD'd in an alley or otherwise end up under those trash heaps in Detroit.
The fact that the coercion in prostitution
will be difficult to establish in law when it is so overwhelmingly
obvious in life is both why it would be difficult to win these cases
and why it is crucial to try. It is also helpful to be trying in a
legal context such as the Thirteenth Amendment that has traditionally
emphasized less how one was subjected in the first place and more the
barriers to leaving the subjected state.
The best thing about criminal law is
that the state does it, so women do not have to. The worst thing about
criminal law is that the state does not do it, so women still have
to. Fortunately for women, the Thirteenth Amendment has a civil application,
meaning we can use it ourselves. Under § 1985(3), prostituted
women could allege that they have been subjected to a conspiracy to
deprive them of civil rights as women. The conspiracy is the easy part--pimps
never do this alone. In a supply-side conspiracy, they prostitute women
through organized crime, gangs, associations, cults, families, hotel
owners, and police. There is also a demand-side conspiracy, more difficult
to argue but certainly there, between pimps and tricks.
Long unresolved is whether § 1985(3)
applies to conspiracies on the basis of sex. In a recent case, the
Supreme Court held that the group "women who seek and receive
abortions" was not an adequate class for purposes of § 1985(3)
because it was not based on sex. (63) The
court did not say that sex-based conspiracies are not actionable under § 1985(3);
several members of the court said that they are. Prostituted women
are an even more persuasive sex-based class. How hard can it be to
prove that women are prostituted as women? Not only is prostitution
overwhelmingly done to women by men, every aspect of the condition
has defined gender female as such and as inferior for centuries. Evelina
Giobbe explains how the status and treatment of prostitutes defines
all women as a sex: "[T]he prostitute symbolizes the value of
women in society. She is paradigmatic of women's social, sexual, and
economic subordination in that her status is the basic unit by which
all women's value is measured and to which all women can be reduced." (64) As
Dorchen Leidholdt puts it: "What other job is so deeply gendered
that one's breasts, vagina and rectum constitute the working equipment?
Is so deeply gendered that the workers are exclusively women
and children and young men used like women?" (65) In
addition, the fact that some men are also sold for sex helps make prostitution
look less than biological, less like a sex difference. Treatment that
is socially and legally damaging and stereotypical that overwhelmingly
burdens one sex, but is not unique to one sex, is most readily seen
as sex discrimination.
A civil action under § 1985(3)
would allow prostituted women to sue pimps for sexual slavery, refuting
the lie that prostitution is just a job. Slavery is a lot of work,
but that does not make it just a job, picking cotton being just picking
cotton. The enforced inequality is the issue.
In addition to these legal tools, the
law against pornography that Andrea Dworkin and I wrote gives civil
rights to women in prostitution in a way that could begin to end that
institution. (66) Pornography
is an arm of prostitution. As Annie McCombs once put it to me, when
you make pornography of a woman, you make a prostitute out of her.
The pornography law we wrote is concretely grounded in the experience
of prostituted women; women coerced into pornography are coerced into
prostitution. It is also based on the experience of women in prostitution
who are assaulted because of pornography. Beyond this, under its trafficking
provision, any woman, in or out of prostitution, who can prove women
are harmed through the materials could sue pornographers for trafficking
women. This provision recognizes the unity of women as a class rather
than dividing prostituted women from all women. The precluded options
that get women into prostitution, hence pornography, affect all women,
as does the fact that pornography harms all women, if not all in the
same way.
Subordination on the basis of sex is
key to our pornography law. Pornography is defined as graphic sexually
explicit materials that subordinate women (or anyone) on the basis
of sex. Women in prostitution are the first women pornography subordinates.
In its prohibition on coercion into pornography, in making their subordination
actionable, this law sets the first floor beneath the condition of
prostituted women, offers the first civil right that limits how much
they can be violated. It does not do all that they need, but it is
a lot more than the nothing that they have.
This law uses the artifact nature of
pornography to hold the perpetrators accountable for what they do.
Before this, the pictures have been used against women: to blackmail
them into prostitution and keep them there, as a technologically sophisticated
way of possessing and exchanging women as a class. Under this law,
the pornography becomes proof of the woman's injury as well as an instance
of it.
Because pornography affects all women
and connects all forms of sexual subordination, so does this law. And
this law reaches the pornography. The way subordination is done in
pornography is the way it is done in prostitution is the way it is
done in the rest of the world: rape, battering, sexual abuse of children,
sexual harassment, and murder are sold in prostitution and are the
acts out of which pornography is made. Addressing pornography in this
way builds a base among women for going after prostitution as a violation
of equality rights.
For years I have been saying that I
do not know what to do, legally, about prostitution. I still do not.
State constitutions and human rights remedies could be adapted to use
the argument I offer here. The Florida statute Meg Baldwin wrote and
got passed is brilliant and is beginning to be used by women. (67) Recent
international initiatives build on superb long-term work and support
these efforts. (68) I
do know that we need to put the power to act directly in women's hands
more than we have. (69)
These thoughts are offered to honor
Evelina Giobbe's demand for an institutional policy response to the
reality of prostitution, toward the civil rights all women are entitled
to.
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Footnotes
(42) Case
of Mary Clark, 1 Blackf. 122 (Ind. 1821). See generally Hamilton, supra note
29. BACK
(43) See,
e.g., Mussry, 726 F.2d 1448. The later ruling by the
Supreme Court in Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, restricting
Mussry doctrines does not cut back on this aspect of the
courts' customary approach to this issue. BACK
(44) United
States v. King, 840 F.2d 1276, 1281 (6th Cir.1988), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 894 (1988) (finding a conspiracy to deprive
children living in a religious commune of rights under Thirteenth
Amendment, in part because of a belief by the children that
they "had no viable alternative but to perform service
for the defendants."). When physical force is also present, Kozminski poses
no barrier to prosecution. Id. at 1281. BACK
(45) United
States v. Bibbs, 564 F.2d 1165, 1168 (5th Cir.1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 1007 (1978). BACK
(46) Hamilton, supra note
29, at 7. BACK
(47) This
term was apparently used originally to parallel and distinguish
prostitution of all women, including women of color, from slavery
of Africans as such. Traite des Noires, trade in Blacks,
referred to slavery of Blacks; in 1905, Traite des Blanches,
trade in whites, was used at an international conference to
refer to sexual sale and purchase of women and children. Marlene
D. Beckman, Thc White Slave Traffic Act: The Historical
Impact of a Criminal Law Policy on Women, 72 GEO. L.J.
1111 n.2 (1984) (citing V. BULLOUGH, PROSTITUTION: AN ILLUSTRATED
HISTORY 245 (1978)); KATHLEEN BARRY, supra note 4, at 32 (1979).
The British government translated the latter term as "White
Slave Traffic or Trade," then shortened to white slavery.
Beckman, supra at 1111 n.2 (quoting BULLOUGH, at 245).
Whatever its initial intent, the appellation "had immediate
appeal to racists who could and did conclude that the efforts
were against an international traffic in white women," although
women of all colors were exploited in prostitution. BARRY,
supra note 4, at 32. Kathleen Barry further observes that the
1921 substitution of the term "Traffic in Women and Children" for
white slavery worked to separate international trafficking
in women from local prostitution, "thereby distracting
attention from the continuing enslavement of women in local
prostitution." BARRY, supra note 4, at 32-33. Recognizing
prostitution as unconstitutional slavery would help restore
this attention. BACK
(48) Here
I draw on Akhil Amar's and Daniel Widawsky's proposed working
definition of slavery. Akhil Amar & Daniel Widawsky, Child
Abuse as Slavery: A Thirteenth Amendment Response to DeShaney,
105 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1365 (1992). BACK
(49) See
generally Leidholdt, supra note 28; BARRY, supra
note 4, at 3-5; Activities for the Advancement of Women:
Equality, Development and Peace, U.N. ESCOR, 1st Sess.,
Provisional Agenda Item 12, at 7-8, U.N. Doc. E/1983/7 (1983). BACK
(50) For
analogous situations, see Jaremillo v. Romero, 1 N.M. 190,
197-99 (1857) (involuntary servitude formally sanctioned by
law). See also Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25, 29-31
(1942) (striking down state laws which did not sanction involuntary
servitude directly, but played a key role in it). BACK
(51) This
raises a civil claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1981) and
potential criminal prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 242 (Supp.1992). BACK
(52) Activities
for the Advancement of Women: Equality, Development and Peace,
supra note 49, at 8 (quoting testimony by three "collectives" of
women prostitutes given to the Congress of Nice on September
8, 1981). BACK
(53) The
Peonage Cases, 123 F. 671, 681 (M.D. Ala. 1903) (stating that
the trier of fact "must consider the situation of the
parties, the relative inferiority or inequality between the
person contracting to perform the service and the person exercising
the force or influence to compel its performance . . . ."). BACK
(54) See,
e.g., Pierce v. United States, 146 F.2d 84 (5th Cir.1944), cert.
denied, 324 U.S. 873 (1945); Bernal v. United States,
241 F. 339 (5th Cir.1917), cert. denied, 245 U.S.
672 (1918). Scc also United States v. Harris, 534
F.2d 207, 214 (10th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
941 (1976) (upholding conviction for involuntary servitude
in prostitution context). BACK
(55) Pierce,
146 F.2d at 84. BACK
(56) Bernal,
241 F. at 341. BACK
(57) A
grand jury in Austin, Texas failed to indict a man for rape
where the victim asked him to wear a condom. Apparently, the
woman's request somehow implied her consent. Ross E. Milloy, Furor
Over a Decision Not to Indict in a Rape Case, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 25, 1992, § 1 at 30. A second grand jury did indict
the man for rape and he was later convicted in a jury trial. Rapist
Who Agreed to Use Condom Gets 40 Years, N.Y. TIMES, May
15, 1993, § 1 at 6. BACK
(58) For
data on rape in prostitution, see Leidholdt, supra note 28,
at 138; Mimi H. Silbert & Ayala M. Pines, Occupational
Hazards of Street Prostitutes, 8 CRIM. JUST. BEHAV. 395,
397 (1981) (70% of San Francisco street prostitutes reported
rape by clients an average of 31 times); COUNCIL FOR PROSTITUTION
ALTERNATIVES, 1991 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (48% of prostitutes were
raped by pimps an average of 16 times a year, 79% by johns
an average of 33 times a year). For data on beatings, see Silbert & Pines, supra at
397 (65% of prostitutes beaten by customers); COUNCIL FOR PROSTITUTION
ALTERNATIVES, supra at 4 (63% were beaten by pimps an
average of 58 times a year). For data on mortality, see PORNOGRAPHY
AND PROSTITUTION IN CANADA: REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE
ON PORNOGRAPHY AND PROSTITUTION, VOLUME II 350 (1985) (finding
that in Canada the mortality rate for prostituted women is
40 times the national average); Leidholdt, supra note
28, at 138 n.15 (the Justice Department estimates that a third
of the over 4,000 women killed by serial murderers in 1982
were prostitutes). BACK
TUTION ALTERNATIVES, 1991 ANNUAL REPORT 4
(48% of prostitutes were raped by pimps an average of 16 times
a year, 79% by johns an average of 33 times a year). For data
on beatings, see Silbert & Pines, supra at 397 (65%
of prostitutes beaten by customers); COUNCIL FOR PROSTITUTION
ALTERNATIVES, supra at 4 (63% were beaten by pimps an
average of 58 times a year). For data on mortality, see PORNOGRAPHY
AND PROSTITUTION IN CANADA: REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE
ON PORNOGRAPHY AND PROSTITUTION, VOLUME II 350 (1985) (finding
that in Canada the mortality rate for prostituted women is
40 times the national average); Leidholdt, supra note
28, at 138 n.15 (the Justice Department estimates that a third
of the over 4,000 women killed by serial murderers in 1982
were prostitutes). BACK
(59) See Mimi
H. Silbert & Ayala M. Pines, Entrance into Prostitution,
13 YOUTH & SOCIETY 471, 479 (1982) (60% of prostitutes
were sexually abused in childhood); Leidholdt, supra note
28, at 136 n.4 (quoting MIMI SILBERT, SEXUAL ASSAULT OF PROSTITUTES:
PHASE ONE 40 (1980)) (66% of subjects are sexually assaulted
by father or father figure); THE COUNCIL FOR PROSTITUTION ALTERNATIVES,
1991 ANNUAL REPORT 3 (85% of clients have histories of sexual
abuse in childhood, 70% most frequently by their fathers). BACK
(60) See CECILIE
HOIGARD & LIV FINSTAD, BACKSTREETS: PROSTITUTION, MONEY,
AND LOVE 76 (Katherine Hanson et al. trans., 1992) (average
age of prostitutes interviewed in Norway began at 15 1/2 years). Compare Leidholdt, supra note
28, at 136 n.3 (citing Evelina Giobbe, founder of Minneapolis-based
advocacy project, Women Hurt in Systems of Prostitution Engaged
in Revolt (WHISPER)) (fourteen is the average age of women's
entry into prostitution); Roberta Perkins, Working Girls:
Prostitutes, This Life and Social Control 258 (1991) (finding
in her Australian sample that almost half entered prostitution
before age 20, and over 80% before age 25); Mimi H. Silbert & Ayala
M. Pines, Occupational Hazards of Street Prostitutes,
8 CRIM. JUST. BEHAV. 395, 396 (1981) (68% were 16 years or
younger when entered prostitution). BACK
(61) For
a superb discussion of the "choice" illusion, see
Leidholdt, supra note 28, at 136-138. BACK
(62) For
an argument that domestic battery of women is involuntary servitude,
see Joyce E. McConnell, Beyond Metaphor: Battered Woman,
Involuntary Servitude, and the Thirteenth Amendment, 4
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 207 (1992). BACK
(63) Bray
v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 122 L. Ed. 2d 34, 46,
47 n.2 (1993). BACK
(64) Evelina
Giobbe, Confronting the Liberal Lies about Prostitution,
in THE SEXUAL LIBERTY AND THE ATTACK ON FEMINISM 67, 77
(Dorchen Leidholdt & Janice G. Raymond eds., 1990). BACK
(65) Leidholdt,
supra note 28, at 138-39. BACK
(66) See ANDREA
DWORKIN & CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, PORNOGRAPHY & CIVIL
RIGHTS: A NEW DAY FOR WOMEN'S EQUALITY apps. A, B, & C
(1988). BACK
(67) FLA.
STAT. ch. 796.09 (1992) (providing a cause of action for those
coerced into prostitution to sue their pimps for compensatory
and punitive damages). See Margaret A. Baldwin, Strategies
of Connection: Prostitution and Feminist Politics, 1 MICH.
J. GENDER & L. 65, 70 (1993) (reporting that several cases
utilizing this statute are currently underway at the discovery
stage prior to filing). BACK
(68) See Gayle
Kirshenbaum, A Potential Landmark for Female Human Rights,
Ms., Sept./Oct. 1991, at 13 (report on proposed U.N. Convention
Against All Forms of Sexual Exploitation). BACK
(69) The
proposed Sexual Exploitation convention would require states'
parties to adopt legislature to "hold liable" traffickers
in pornography. International Convention to Eliminate All Forms
of Sexual Exploitation, Sept. 1993, Art. 6(d). BACK
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